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On the eve of  NATO’s 70th anniversary, French President Macron called NATO “brain dead” while advocating for increased European de-
fence capacity, possibly alongside NATO rather than 
through it. The German reaction was cold. Defence 
Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer responded: “If  we re-
inforce Europe’s defence, we have to reinforce the 
European presence within NATO”.1 Which path is 
the future of  European security likely to take, and do 
elites and the public see these paths as mutually ex-
clusive?
Considering domestic politics is essential when 
thinking about the future of  European security and 
defence. Governments of  differing political outlooks 
shape policy agendas. The political parties that form 
governments, in turn, are constrained by the prefer-
1  S. Johansson, “NATO dismisses French president’s call for ‘strategic’ 
nuclear dialogue”, The Brussels Times, 17 February 2020.
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ences of  voters who put them in power. 
This Policy Brief summarizes German and French 
party positions towards NATO and European de-
fence, and examines public opinion in both countries 
using survey data we collected in the fall of  2019.
In both countries, there is space for building great-
er European military capacity. Key parties support 
building a stronger Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). A large majority of  citizens in both 
countries supports some European military cooper-
ation independent of  NATO, and few in the public 
believe that NATO alone is sufficient for European 
security and defence. That said, not many parties (and 
only a minority of  the public) actively share Macron’s 
vision of  a French-led European defence co-opera-
tion to serve as an alternative to NATO. The particu-
lar configuration of  French parties and voters (which 
are more hawkish and more sceptical of  NATO) 
and the semi-presidential system that leaves security 
and defence issues as a prerogative of  the president 
mean Macron faces fewer domestic constraints than 
German leaders in trying to re-envision European de-
fence.
Political parties, NATO, and European 
security and defence
Germany, mostly NATO-friendly
In the aftermath of  the Second World War, Germany 
developed a strategic culture that emphasizes alliances 
and (mostly) eschews national military capacity. One 
facet of  this weltanschauung (world view) is Germany’s 
strong support of  NATO. Germany’s biggest par-
ty, the CDU/CSU, is also the most NATO-friendly, 
though the SPD favours membership as well.2 Both 
parties share a common view on the purpose of  
2  The CDU/CSU has been more united on this issue than the SPD, 
where some factions of  the party are more NATO-sceptical.
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NATO: serving as a deterrent against aggression and 
minimizing the possibility of  involvement in protract-
ed armed conflict. The key difference is one of  degree: 
the SPD sees NATO as a key element of  German se-
curity and defence that sits alongside other internation-
al organizations, while the CDU/CSU views NATO 
as the cornerstone of  the country’s defence posture. 
This difference matters when it comes to CSDP – 
both parties support the European institution, but 
the CDU/CSU is critical of  policies that would make 
CSDP a competitive alternative to NATO.
As is common in parliamentary systems, other par-
ties may hold the key to government formation. Sim-
ilarly to the SPD, the Green Party emphasizes various 
institutional options such as NATO and CSDP but 
overall gives primacy to the more inclusive UN in se-
curity matters. The far right populist party Alternative 
für Deutschland is sceptical of  European institutions, 
but is able to “tolerate” NATO. The far left Die Linke 
is in even starker contrast with the status quo in op-
posing NATO altogether. The classically liberal Free 
Democrats strongly support NATO membership, 
and like the CDU/CSU are willing to contribute to 
CSDP as long as it does not compete with NATO.3
Overall, NATO is widely supported in Germany, 
especially by parties who have been in government at 
least once. Political opposition typically is rooted in 
a combination of  ideological opposition to military 
alliances and generalized preferences for other inter-
national organizations (most notably the UN). 
France, mostly NATO-sceptic
France has a more interventionist strategic culture 
compared to Germany. Debates over military inter-
vention mostly revolve around French “autonomy” 
versus “influence”. This tension is reflected by French 
oscillation between preferring “to go it alone” as the 
best way to accomplish security and defence policy 
goals and preferring NATO or the EU. Macron’s re-
cent efforts clearly come down on the side of  influ-
ence, and greater European capacity within a CSDP 
framework offers opportunities for France to become 
the driving force behind EU defence posturing.
The party system in France is more fluid than in 
Germany. President Macron’s recently constituted 
party, La République En Marche (LREM), is a “catch-
all” centrist party with former members of  centre-left 
and centre-right parties. Macron – a committed Eu-
rophile – has advocated for greater EU security and 
defence capacity and integration, with France leading 
the way. Although supportive of  NATO, his LREM 
party believes in separate military projects led by the 
EU (or not) and that Continental defence should not 
3  In the public opinion data – fielded from 15 August to 3 September 
2019 – employed below, we break respondents down by their identification 
with each of  these political parties, measured by profile variables obtained 
from YouGov respondents in 2017.
be left solely to NATO, particularly in the Trump era.
French Socialists traditionally express scepticism to-
wards NATO, viewing it as an American-dominated 
project that prevents France from having a distinc-
tive foreign policy. Like LREM, the Socialists ponder 
a European alternative where the French voice can be 
heard more loudly.
Currently, the largest opposition party is Rassem-
blement National (RN), led by the right-wing populist 
Marine Le Pen. Whereas Macron clearly emphasizes 
the influence side of  the French debate, the RN stri-
dently prefers autonomy, 
favouring withdrawal from 
NATO and opposing deep-
er European integration in 
all areas, defence included. 
France’s two-round voting 
system makes it unlikely 
that RN will lead – or even 
participate in – govern-
ment, so we consider RN 
a “fringe” opposition party 
despite its strong standing 
in the polls. A smaller Eurosceptic fringe opposition 
party, Debout la France, is a right-wing Gaullist party 
deeply sceptical of  the European Union.
On the other side of  the spectrum, La France In-
soumise and the Greens (EELV) are deeply NA-
TO-sceptic. Those left parties advocate a fundamen-
tal rethink around the European Union. Similar to the 
German Greens, they believe that defence-related ac-
tions should take place under frameworks established 
by the United Nations.
The traditional mainstream right party is Les Ré-
publicains (LR) who reintegrated France into NATO’s 
command structure under President Sarkozy in 2009 
but shows less commitment to deep European se-
curity and defence integration than En Marche!. That 
said, the party is willing to discuss the prospect of  
the EU as a force to defend the Continent’s borders. 
The centrist Union of  Democrats and Independents (UDI), 
which is a shadow of  its former self, generally sup-
ports deeper integration.
As with Germany, parties traditionally considered 
to be on the left are NATO-sceptic both because they 
are more dovish generally and mistrust US power 
(e.g. Socialists). Parties on the extreme right oppose 
NATO not out of  dovishness, but because they pre-
fer French autonomy. Parties that are centre to cen-
tre-right generally favour a range of  action for France, 
hence support both NATO and CSDP.
Public opinion towards military coopera-
tion
In August 2019, we fielded public opinion studies in 
France and Germany through an online survey. Re-
Not many parties 
actively share Macron’s 
vision of a French-led 
European defence co-
operation to serve as an 
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spondents evaluated statements about their nations’ 
defence relationships with NATO and the European 
Union. Table 1 presents three of  these items that focus 
on NATO. Specifically, we report the proportion that 
agrees with each statement, subdivided by the respon-
dents’ partisan identification, including those without 
any party identification. The parties are grouped by 
type: governing, “mainstream opposition”, “extreme 
opposition” and “unaffiliated”.4 Data are weighted to 
better reflect the underlying population.
Several key points emerge from the survey. First, 
consistent with the positions of  German parties, the 
German public shows much higher agreement that 
“NATO is essential for national defence” than the 
French. Among Germans who identify with a party 
in government or a mainstream opposition party, a 
majority of  respondents agree with this statement. In 
France, however, only 38 percent of  government par-
ty identifiers see NATO as essential, and less than 40 
percent of  identifiers of  mainstream opposition hold 
that view. In both nations, the tendency of  voters of  
the far left and far right to fall away from NATO is 
4  For Germany, we classified those identifying with CDU/CSU and 
SPD as identified with the government, identifiers of  the Greens and 
the FDP as supporters for the mainstream opposition and voters for the 
Left and AfD as extreme opposition. For France, LREM identifiers are 
classified as supporting government, voters for Les Re´publicains, EELV, 
Socialist and UDI as mainstream opposition and voters of  La France in-
soumise, Debout, and RN as fringe opposition. 
evident, and reflective of  party positioning. While 
NATO support is substantially lower among these 
groups, it remains above 25 percent for all fringe par-
ties. Finally, few supporters of  any party agree with 
the statement that “NATO is sufficient for Europe-
an military defence, the EU does not need to get in-
volved in this”.
Table 2 reports results from a question that asks 
voters to make a choice between defence cooperation 
within NATO and independent of  NATO. A plurality 
of  respondents in both nations want a mixed effort. 
However, German respondents are almost twice as 
likely to answer “it is better to strengthen military co-
operation within NATO”, while French respondents 
are more likely to answer “it is better to create Euro-
pean military cooperation independent of  NATO”. 
Interestingly, the responses to this question are sim-
ilar across the different partisan groups within each 
country.
A wide support for European capacity
Table 1 shows that less than 20 percent of  the public 
in Germany or France believe that NATO is sufficient 
for European security and defence. Table 2 tells a re-
markably similar story. The plurality of  voters in both 
countries prefers a “mixed” approach to addressing 
security problems – military cooperation should be 
Table 1: Attitudes towards NATO in Germany and France by party identification
Party 
(% of  sample)
NATO essential
(%)
Make NATO 
obsolete
(%)
NATO sufficient
(%)
Germany
Governing
Parties
CDU/CSU (19%) 55 24 18
SPD (12%) 53 26 16
Mainstream 
Opposition
FDP (5%) 49 30 13
Greens (11%) 56 24 17
Extreme 
Opposition
AfD (10%) 36 29 20
Die Linke (6%) 27 33 18
Unaffiliated No party ID (29%) 37 17 11
France
Governing Party LREM (11%) 38 47 14
Mainstream Left 
Opposition
Socialists (6%) 38 38 20
EELV (7%) 37 41 17
Mainstream Right 
Opposition
Republicains (10%) 42 37 15
UDI (1%) 21 42 0
Extreme 
Opposition
Debout (2%) 31 40 19
Insoumise (6%) 32 38 19
RN (12%) 28 36 18
Unaffiliated No party ID (25%) 25 34 11
Note: Percent agreeing with statement. The original statements read as following: 1) NATO is an essential part of  [country’s] national se-
curity; 2) Eventually, European defence should make NATO obsolete; 3) NATO is sufficient for European military defence, the EU does 
not need to get involved in this.
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strengthened within NATO and European military 
cooperation independent of  NATO should be cre-
ated. When one adds this 
“mixed” option to those 
who explicitly prefer EU 
military cooperation, 
then large majorities of  
the public support some 
kind of  increased Euro-
pean capacity. 
Our analysis is that 
public sentiment means 
there is surprisingly wide 
latitude in both coun-
tries to expand CSDP, 
although Macron proba-
bly has more freedom to manoeuvre than German 
leaders. 
While public sentiment is open to increased Euro-
pean capacity in both countries, there are differences. 
The French public is less tied to NATO and more 
open to European cooperation, yet, it may express 
greater scepticism of  arrangements that limit the 
country’s autonomy. In Germany, there is greater sup-
port of  NATO, which is part of  more support gener-
ally for international security and defence institutions. 
Despite differences between these two countries, 
both Merkel and Macron have contributed to building 
European security and defence capability, for example 
through the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO). This investment would not necessarily only 
benefi t the EU but could also help European contri-
butions in NATO. This said, COVID-19 is likely to 
affect policy and budget priorities both in Germany 
and in France, and it remains to be seen how these 
changes affect investment – in both fi nancial and po-
litical capital – in greater European military capacity. 
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There is surprisingly 
wide latitude in both 
countries to expand 
CSDP, although 
Macron probably 
has more freedom 
to manoeuvre than 
German leaders 
Table 2: Preferences for European security in Germany and France by party identifi cation
Party
(% of  sample)
Strengthen 
NATO
(in %)
Mixed
(in %)
European 
military
co-operation
(in %)
Don’t know
(in %)
Germany
Governing 
Parties
CDU/CSU (19%) 21 42 27 12
SPD (12%) 19 44 25 13
Mainstream 
Opposition
FDP (5%) 14 46 29 10
Greens (11%) 18 45 28 9
Extreme 
Opposition
AfD (10%) 19 22 22 24
Die Linke (6%) 18 40 29 14
Unaffi liated No party ID (29%) 14 37 18 32
France
Governing 
Party LREM (11%) 10 43 36 12
Mainstream 
Left 
Opposition
Socialists (6%) 6 43 33 17
EELV (7%) 8 44 35 17
Mainstream 
Right 
Opposition
Republicains (10%) 12 45 36 6
UDI (1%) 20 42 14 23
Extreme 
Opposition
Debout (2%) 4 27 52 17
Insoumise (6%) 11 47 31 12
RN (12%) 17 31 38 15
Unaffi liated No party ID (25%) 7 36 26 31
Note: The endpoint anchors to this question read as following: 1) To address security problems, it is better to strengthen military co-opera-
tion within NATO; 2) To address these problems, it is better to create European military co-operation independent of  NATO.
